What Is Pragmatism?

This is an extremely satisfying book, that is, if the reader be not a pragmatist. It is seldom that one finds so much clear thinking and lucid exposition in so small a space. The author has endeavored first of all to understand rather than to refute pragmatism, yet the adherents of the new philosophy will be sure to say that he has not succeeded. To them the six chapters of the book will appear so many masses of tangled confusion. And it does not seem probable that continued discussion will lead to a perfect understanding, the difference being so largely temperamental. Pragmatism, we are told, is a temper of mind, an attitude, and so far as it is this, it cannot be changed by argumentation. It is generally recognized that philosophic attitudes and religious beliefs are ultimately a matter of constitutional, vital reaction, that as the sphinx looks out on the sand because she was cut out for that purpose, so we face the world in certain characteristic ways because 'it is our nature to.' Discussion is not valueless, however, partly for the reason that there are many mixed temperaments, and partly because pragmatism is more than an attitude; it "offers us a theory of meaning, a theory of truth, and a theory of knowledge." It is besides a general way of looking at things, and is trying to work out a theory of reality. The object of the first chapter of this book is to clearly state the pragmatic theory of meaning. This is not easy on account of the many concessions and qualifications that have been made. In general the doctrine is that meanings can be defined in terms of consequences in our future practical experience. It is then explained that this practical experience is either active or passive and that it includes theoretical consequences, but it is not clear whose experience is in question, that of the individual, that of all human beings, or that of all actual or possible rational or sentient beings. Furthermore, it is simply not a fact that the meaning of a proposition consists in its consequences. For not only do we know what we mean by the battle of marathon, but even in cases in which future consequences are to be expected, we know perfectly well what we mean adore they occur. Indeed, this is the very nature of meaning and to explain it away is to deny it altogether.... Again, it cannot be admitted that all ideas are plans of action; many of them are judgments of fact or existence, and in innumerable cases those who seek the truth in such matters, do not want to do anything with it; they want the knowledge for its own sake and have no further plan than to satisfy the desire to know. Pragmatism does not help in the select1on of our problems. In practice it merely results in putting under the ban all questions which are not to the taste of the individual who wields the criterion. It cannot decide what men ought to find interesting, and on its own principles it cannot taboo the investigation of any questions which men actually yearn to solve. -The Philosophical Review, Volume [1909]